Northvolt was the first to go big - and everyone else was expected to follow.
The logic seemed sound: show automakers you can deliver scale and competitive pricing, and the investments will flow. Northvolt’s model - multiple gigafactories, vertically integrated supply chains, and recycling - became the blueprint. I can easily imagine how at every investor meeting, battery startups were grilled: “Why aren’t you doing what Northvolt is doing?”
I’ve been in that hot seat myself. As CEO of Renera, a Russian gigafactory startup, I faced the same investor pressure. Names like Northvolt and Britishvolt were dropped into every conversation. We started with a modest 500 MWh line but were soon pitching an 8 GWh plant just to keep the funding conversations alive. Luckily, we had a 250 MWh electrode and cell factory in Korea already running, which gave us some confidence to scale - but not every startup had that luxury.
Then, reality hit.
In November, Northvolt’s model showed its cracks. Fast forward to now: Freyr and KORE Power canceled factories last week. TotalEnergies, once bullish, is telling ACC to focus on one gigafactory instead of three.
Was it all because of the “Northvolt Effect”? I can’t say for sure. But the pattern is hard to ignore.
Going big sounds good in a pitch deck. But scaling hardware isn’t just about raising money - it's about operational execution, technological readiness, and market demand. The push for aggressive scaling and vertical integration, driven by investor expectations, may have toppled more startups than it helped.
Curious to hear your thoughts: How much do you think investor pressure to scale too quickly has contributed to these failures of western battery startups? Or is it just the nature of the battery industry beast? 🔋